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We develop a model of the plaintiff’s decision to file a lawsuit that has implications
for how differences between the federal government and private litigants translate
into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model
generates a set of predictions for relative trial rates and plaintiff win rates, depending
on the type of case and whether the government is defendant or plaintiff. To test the
model, we use data on about 474,000 cases filed in federal district court between
1979 and 1994 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination, in which the
federal government and private parties work under roughly similar legal rules. We
find broad support for the predictions of the model.

1. Introduction
The process by which potential plaintiffs decide whether to pursue a
claim by filing a lawsuit has important implications for case outcomes,
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including the trial rate and the success rate at trial. In an earlier article
(Eisenberg and Farber, 1997) we develop and test a theory of case selection that predicts different trial rates and trial win rates for corporations
and individuals based on hypothesized differences in the variance of their
litigation costs. In this study we provide a further test of the case selection model by extending our analysis to cases involving the United States
as litigant, both as plaintiff and defendant.
Understanding federal government litigation is important in its own
right because it comprises a substantial portion of the federal courts’ business. Cases in which the United States’s presence as a party formed a basis
for federal jurisdiction accounted for 29.3% of the 5,017,603 federal civil
nonbankruptcy cases terminated from January 1, 1979, to September 30,
2000, and for 15.6% of the 171,217 cases that terminated by judgment
after trial. To the extent that the government has distinctive characteristics as a litigant, comparison of its litigation patterns with those of private
litigants provides an important empirical test of the case selection model.
In the next section we describe two substantive areas in which the legal
standards governing cases with the United States and with private parties
are similar: personal injury torts and job discrimination. Cases in these
areas will form the basis of our empirical analysis.
In section 3 we develop a model of the plaintiff’s decision to file a lawsuit (a case selection model) with implications for trial rates and plaintiff
win rates at trial. The model implies that trial rates will be inversely
related to defendant costs and to the probability of defendant liability.
The model also implies that the probability of a plaintiff win at trial is
directly related to plaintiffs’ costs and to the probability of defendant liability and inversely related to defendants’ costs and the stakes of the case.
The model interprets costs broadly to include not only pecuniary costs
but also the psychological, emotional, and other difficult-to-quantify factors associated with litigation for private litigants (Eisenberg and Farber,
1997). Government litigants, who need not worry about profitable performance in the same manner as private litigants, and who operate in a
different institutional structure, are likely to have costs, broadly defined,
that differ from private litigants’.
In sections 4 and 5 we discuss likely differences between the government and private parties as litigants in tort and job discrimination cases.
Although the basic legal standards governing tort and job discrimination
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cases between the government and private parties are similar, we note four
differences between the characteristics of government and private action:
(1) the government has lower costs (including less aversion to litigating
a case to trial) than do private parties as defendants in both tort and job
discrimination cases; (2) the stakes are lower in both tort and job discrimination cases with the government as defendant, relative to cases with
private parties as defendant; (3) the government as plaintiff in job discrimination cases generally brings cases of higher quality (higher probability of
liability) than do private plaintiffs; and (4) average litigation costs among
private plaintiffs in job discrimination cases are lower than the average
government litigation costs in the same role.
The selection model developed in section 3 has clear implications for
how these differences will affect case outcomes. We predict that the trial
rate will be higher and the plaintiff win rate will be higher in cases in
which the government is defendant (relative to cases with private defendants). We also predict that the trial rate will be lower and the plaintiff win
rate will be higher in job discrimination cases in which the government is
plaintiff (relative to job discrimination cases with private plaintiffs).
In section 6 we describe the data we use for the empirical analysis.
These data, on about 474,000 cases filed in federal district court between
1979 and 1994 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination, are
extracted from the Federal Court Integrated Data Base, made available
through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
The results of the empirical analysis are contained in section 7. We find
support for all of the predictions save one. The single anomalous result is
that the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with the government
as defendant is lower than the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination
cases with private defendants. The results confirm the need to consider
the prefiling selection process in interpreting postfiling patterns of case
outcomes.

2. Areas with Common Legal Standards for Both
Government and Private Litigants
Analyzing the government as litigant requires classes of cases that
involve governments and private parties in the same roles. In addition,
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to allow for meaningful comparison, similar legal standards should govern private and government litigants, and any differences in legal standards
should have clear implications for the characteristics of cases filed. In general, litigation involving the United States is not typical of the mass of
litigation. Cases initiated by the government include a massive number of
highly successful, quickly resolved collection actions.1 Even noncollection contract litigation involving the government may differ from private
litigation. A contract case against the government may not be fundamentally the same as a contract case against a private party. A whole subfield
of government contract law exists.
At least two subject areas contain both government and private litigants
and share governing legal standards: tort cases and job discrimination
cases, and we restrict our analysis to case outcomes in these areas. In the
remainder of this section, we outline the legal standards in these areas
and note some clear differences between the laws governing private and
government litigants. We will rely on these differences to generate most
of the testable implications of the selection model for case outcomes.

2.1. Tort Cases Based on State Law
Federal court tort cases in which the federal government is the defendant are, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), based on state law.
The law of the state where the tort occurs governs the action, and the
federal government is expressly made liable when a private party would
be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1999); 28 U.S.C § 2674 (1994).
State substantive tort law also governs federal court tort cases in which
the diverse residence of private parties is the basis for federal jurisdiction
(see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins). Thus, the substantive law governing
federal court tort actions against the federal government is substantially
similar to the law governing federal court actions against private defendants.
Differences in the law governing the two classes of tort actions do exist.
Unless the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that at least $75,000 is in controversy, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear diversity cases. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (Supp. V 1999). This amount was increased from $10,000 in
1. For summary statistics about the large number of collection and enforcement
actions in federal court, see Clermont and Eisenberg (1995:Appendix).
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1988 (Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988)), and from $50,000 in 1996
(Pub. L. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996)). FTCA cases are subject to a
requirement that plaintiffs first present their claims to the appropriate federal agency.2 Additionally, the FTCA provides the U.S. with a defense,
the discretionary function exception, which is not generally available in
private tort litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). And neither punitive
damages nor jury trials are available against the U.S. under the FTCA.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2402, 2674 (1999). We consider below the effect of these
differences on expected case outcomes.

2.2. Job Discrimination Cases
Our second group of cases is job discrimination cases. The bulk of
employment discrimination suits are brought in federal court under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Most of these cases involve private
plaintiffs suing private defendants. In Title VII cases, however, the United
States can be present on either side of the lawsuit. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may bring Title VII actions on behalf
of private litigants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). And the Attorney
General may sue in cases involving a pattern or practice of intentional
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1994). Departments, agencies, and
units of the United States may be, and often are, defendants in Title VII
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994).
The substantive legal standards governing purely private Title VII litigation are the same as the legal standards that apply when the United
States appears as a defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)–(d) (1994). Thus,
Title VII cases allow one to compare the government’s behavior both as
a plaintiff and as a defendant with the behavior of private parties.
Some differences between legal rules that apply to government and
those that apply to private litigants are again worth noting. Plaintiffs
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994) states in part: “An action shall not be instituted upon
a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency
and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by
certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a
claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time
thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.”
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suing either private or government defendants for discrimination must
first present their claims administratively. But the agencies to which complaints must be presented differ. Plaintiffs suing the United States must
first present their claims to the decision-making federal agency or unit.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994). Plaintiffs suing private defendants must
first present their claims to a state equal opportunity employment commission or to the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
A statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), under which one may sue private
defendants for employment discrimination, is not available against the
United States as an entity. During most of the period covered by this
study, in cases of intentional discrimination, section 1981 provided a basis
for blacks and other minorities, but not women, to seek compensatory
and punitive damages and jury trials. These remedies were not available
in Title VII actions against the United States (Eisenberg and Schwab,
1988b).3 Section 1981 also has different procedural requirements than
Title VII (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988b, p. 602 n. 38). But available
evidence suggests that differences between case outcomes in Title VII and
section 1981 actions are minimal (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988b, p. 600).4
Once again, we consider the effect of these differences on expected case
outcomes.
3. Two statutory developments during the period covered by this study should be
noted. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the availability of compensatory
damages and jury trials to women in intentional discrimination cases against both
private and governmental defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(2), (c) (1994). Punitive
damages are still not allowed against the government. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was generally effective on November 21, 1991, the
date of Pub. L. No. 102-166’s enactment, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a) 105 Stat.
1099 (1991), and does not apply to cases arising before its enactment. Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., (1994, p. 257). Second, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117 (1994), may, over time, shift the makeup of
filed job discrimination cases. The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990, and became
effective two years later. Pub. L. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 328 (1990). Since, as will
be discussed, we limit the sample to cases filed in 1994 or earlier, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 and ADA cases should have a minor effect on our analysis, and our results do
not materially differ if we limit the sample to cases filed in 1991 or earlier, thereby
eliminating the effect of these statutory developments.
4. “Examining the outcome and procedural progress of section 1981 litigation
reveals no distinctive pattern differentiating it from litigation under section 1983 and
title VII.” This is likely because of the considerable overlap between section 1981
actions and Title VII actions (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988b, pp. 602–603).
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3. Theoretical Framework
In our earlier work we developed a theoretical framework to examine
the effect on suit outcomes of the selection of potential claims for litigation (Eisenberg and Farber, 1997). We extend that selection model here to
consider its implications for the case outcomes, given differences between
the government and private parties as litigants. In this section we develop
a version of this model of the litigation process that includes specifications for the expected trial outcome, the negotiated settlement, and the
probability of a trial. We then use these constructs to model the plaintiff’s
decision regarding whether to file a lawsuit.

3.1. The Basic Model of Case Selection
Consider a potential plaintiff’s decision regarding whether or not to file
a lawsuit. Without being specific about the information structure or timing
of the litigation process, we can say the suit has some expected value to
the plaintiff, EVp , as a function of the likelihood that the defendant
would be found liable at trial (), the expected damages that would be
awarded at trial conditional on a finding of liability (D), and the costs to
the plaintiff and defendant (Cp and Cd respectively) of litigation. More
formally, the plaintiff’s expected value of filing a suit is
EVp  = Vp  D Cp  Cd 

(1)

The potential plaintiff will file a lawsuit if and only if EVp  ≥ 0.5
The plaintiff’s expected value of filing a lawsuit is a probability-oftrial weighted average of the expected outcome at trial and the negotiated
outcome. This is
EVp  = P Yt + 1 − P Yn 

(2)

where P is the plaintiff’s expectation about the probability of trial, Yt is
the plaintiff’s expectation of the trial outcome should a trial occur, and
Yn is the plaintiff’s expectation of the negotiated outcome should such an
5. Depending on the information structure of the game, , D, or Cd (or a combination) may not be known to the plaintiff, ex ante, and, if not known, it will be
represented by the parameters of some prior distribution. An alternative approach to
modeling litigation emphasizes asymmetric information rather than divergent expectations. See, for example, Bebchuk (1984), Daughety and Reinganum (1994), Reinganum
(1982), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Shavell (1996), and Spier (1994).
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outcome occur. We assume for simplicity that the plaintiff and defendant
are risk neutral. Thus, the plaintiff’s utility is Yt from a trial outcome and
Yn from a negotiated outcome. The defendant’s utility is −Yt from a trial
outcome and −Yn from a negotiated outcome.
As a first step toward calculating the probability of trial, we derive
the contract zone, which is the range of potential negotiated settlements
that both parties prefer to a trial outcome. Suppose the parties have common expectations about the level of damages, D, but potentially divergent
expectations about the likelihood of liability at trial. Let the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s expected probability of liability be p and d , respectively.
These expectations can be written as
p =  +  p

(3)

d =  + d 

(4)

and

where  is the common component of the probability of liability and
p and d are the plaintiff’s and defendant’s idiosyncratic components
of the expected probability of liability. The idiosyncratic components are
assumed to have zero mean and to be uncorrelated with other characteristics.6
The plaintiff expects a net value from trial of p D − Cp , and the plaintiff will accept no less than this as a negotiated settlement. Analogously,
the defendant expects a net loss from trial of d D + Cd , and the defendant
will pay no more than this as a negotiated settlement. Thus, the contract
zone is defined by
p D − Cp ≤ Yn ≤ d D + Cd 

(5)

and the size of the contract zone is
CZ = d − p D + Cp + Cd 

(6)

= d − p D + Cp + Cd 

(7)

Note that size of the contract zone does not depend on the common component of the probability of liability (), but it is directly related to the
6. Note that the parties know only their expectations (p and d ) and cannot parse
these into the common component () and their idiosyncratic components (d and p ).
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difference between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s idiosyncratic components (d − p ).
We assume that a necessary and sufficient condition for a negotiated
settlement is that the size of the contract zone is weakly positive. Trial
outcomes occur only when CZ < 0, and this happens only when expectations are relatively optimistic (p > d or p > d ). If expectations
are identical or relatively pessimistic (p ≤ d or p ≤ d ), then positive aggregate costs are sufficient to guarantee CZ ≥ 0 and a negotiated
settlement.7 It is clear from equation (7) that, for any degree of divergent expectations, higher total costs of disagreement (Cp + Cd ) make it
more likely that there will be a positive contract zone. This is a basis
for the claim that higher costs of disagreement lead to more negotiated
settlements and fewer disputes (trials).
The property of the model that a trial occurs if CZ < 0 can be used to
derive the ex ante probability of trial from the plaintiff’s perspective. The
plaintiff knows p , but we assume that the plaintiff does not know d .
However, the plaintiff knows that d is drawn from a distribution with
cumulative distribution function F ·. The condition for a trial, CZ < 0,
can be written, on rearrangement of equation (6), as
Cp + Cd
d < p −

(8)
D
so that the probability of a trial is


Cp + Cd
P = F p −

(9)
D
This implies that trials are more likely where p and D are higher and
where Cp and Cd are lower.
The final quantity needed to compute EVp  is the plaintiff’s expectation of the negotiated outcome should such an outcome occur. In order to
compute this expectation, a specific solution to the bargaining problem is
required, and, as is commonly done in the applied economics literature on
bargaining, we rely on the Nash solution.8 Central to the Nash solution
7. See Farber and Bazerman (1987, 1989), Farber and Katz (1979), Gould (1973),
Landes and Posner (1979), and Posner (1973) for discussions of divergent expectations
as an explanation for disagreements leading to arbitration or litigation.
8. The solution to the Nash bargaining problem is the outcome that satisfies a set of
four axioms (Pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
insensitivity to linear transformations of utility). See Nash (1950). The general character
of results is likely to be supported by the solution to a wide range of bargaining models.
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are the threat points of the parties. These are the payoffs to the parties in
the event that they do not agree on a negotiated settlement, and they are
expressed here as the expected trial outcome net of costs. If the parties
do not agree on a negotiated settlement, the expected trial outcome is to
award p D to the plaintiff. This expected trial outcome yields a payoff to
the plaintiff net of costs of p D − Cp and yields a payoff to the defendant net of costs of −p D − Cd .9 These expected payoffs from a trial
outcome are the threat points of the Nash bargaining model.
In order to derive the Nash solution, first compute for each party the
difference between the payoff from the negotiated settlement and the payoff at trial net of costs. The payoffs at trial net of costs are the threat point
payoffs, and these differences are the net gains from a negotiated settlement relative to receiving the threat point payoffs. The Nash solution to
the bargaining problem is derived as the value of Yn that maximizes the
product of the net gains from a negotiated settlement. This is
W = Yn − p D − Cp  · −Yn − −p D − Cd 

(10)

The solution to this maximization problem yields a negotiated settlement
of
Cd − Cp 
Yn = p D +

(11)
2
which is the negotiation payoff to the plaintiff. Note that Yn is positively
related to the expected trial outcome (p D) and the defendant’s costs (Cd )
and negatively related to the plaintiff’s costs (Cp ).
Now consider the plaintiff’s decision regarding whether to file a lawsuit in the case in which the negotiated settlement is as defined in equation (11). In fact, there may not be a negotiated settlement, and the case
9. Note that using this payoff to the defendant in forming the plaintiff’s expectation regarding the Nash bargaining solution implies that the potential plaintiff ignores
any information there might be in the fact that the parties cannot agree on a negotiated
settlement (i.e., that CZ < 0) and assumes that the defendant has the same probability of liability as the plaintiff (p ). This was done to keep the mathematical exposition
relatively clear. At least two alternatives to this assumption are possible. First, the
plaintiff might realize, in the event that no negotiated settlement is reached, that expectations are sufficiently relatively optimistic to cause CZ < 0. This would mean that
C +C
d < p − p D d and would affect the plaintiff’s expectation of the defendant’s threat
point. Second, the plaintiff might use the unconditional expectation of d based on
F ·. Neither of these alternatives changes the basic character of the theoretical results.
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may go to trial, yielding a net trial payoff to the plaintiff as noted above
of
Yt = p D − Cp 

(12)

This too is positively related to the expected trial outcome and negatively
related to the plaintiff’s costs, but it is unrelated to the defendant’s costs.
Using the Nash solution in equation (11) as the negotiated settlement
and using the net trial payoff in equation (12), the plaintiff’s expected
value for the lawsuit is


C d − Cp
EVp  = 1 − P  p D +
(13)
+ P p D − Cp 
2
C d + Cp
C d − Cp
−P

(14)
2
2
Holding P fixed, it is straightforward to demonstrate, based on equation
(14), that EVp  is increasing in , p , D, and Cd and decreasing in Cp .
However, the case characteristics (with the exception of ) affect P as
well, and this makes it more difficult to ascertain the direction of their
effects on EVP . Specifically,


EVp 
P Cd + C p
(15)
=D−
p
2
p


EVp 
P Cd + C p
(16)
= p −
D
2
D


EVp 
P Cd + C p
1 + P 
−
(17)
=−
Cp
2
Cp
2


EVp 
1 − P 
P Cd + C p
=
−

(18)
Cd
2
Cd
2
=  + p D +

EV 

Since P and DP are positive and CP and CP are negative, only C p
p
p
d
d
can be signed unambiguously (positive). The direct effects of increases
in , p and D are, not surprisingly, positive as increasing the plaintiff’s
expected trial outcome increases the expected value of filing suit. But
increasing the plaintiff’s expected trial outcome (through an increase in p
or D) also increases the probability of trial, which has a negative effect on
the expected value of filing suit. Similarly, the direct effect of an increase
in the plaintiff’s costs is to decrease the expected value of filing suit, but
the increase in plaintiff’s costs decreases the probability of trial, which
has a positive effect on the expected value of filing suit. An increase in
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the defendant’s costs has a positive direct effect on the plaintiff’s expected
value of filing suit, an effect that is reinforced by the implied decrease in
the probability of trial.
We proceed with the reasonable assumption that the effects of the
implied changes in the probability of trial are not sufficiently large to
offset the direct effects. This implies that the plaintiff’s expected value
from filing suit is increasing in , p , D, and Cd and decreasing in Cp .
Thus, plaintiffs are more likely to file suit where , p , D, and Cd are
higher and where Cp is lower.

3.2. Implications of the Model for Trial Rates
The data contain information for filed cases on whether or not the
case was decided through a trial and whether or not the plaintiff won
at trial.10 Equation (9) expresses the ex ante probability of a trial from
the plaintiff’s perspective, P . However, from the analyst’s perspective, the
ex post probability of a trial in cases in which a lawsuit has been filed is
T = Prp − d D − Cp + Cd  > 0EVp  > 0

(19)

= Prp − d D − Cp + Cd  > 0EVp  > 0

(20)

where EVp  is defined in equation (12) as a function of , p , D, Cp ,
and Cd .
Without considering the systematic selection of cases for litigation, the
probability of trial is unrelated to the common component of the probability of liability (), positively related to the stakes (D), and negatively
related to each party’s costs of litigation (Cp and Cd ). However, consideration of the selection process modifies these predictions.
There is no direct effect of the common component of the probability
of liability () on the probability of trial, but there is an indirect effect
through the selection process. The plaintiff’s expected value of filing suit
(EVp ) is positively related to . This implies that an increase in  will
make it optimal to file suit in cases in which the plaintiff’s idiosyncratic
information about the probability of liability (p ) is lower, in which plaintiff’s costs are higher, in which defendant’s costs are lower, and in which
10. More precisely, there is information on whether or not judgment was entered
for the plaintiff after trial. We discuss below potential problems in interpreting this
information as indicating a plaintiff win.
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the stakes are lower. With the exception of the decrease in defendant’s
costs, all of these changes in the composition of cases filed imply that the
trial rate will be lower where the common component of the probability
of liability is higher.
The direct effect of the stakes (D) on the trial rate is positive, but
the indirect effect through the case selection process offsets this to some
extent. The plaintiff’s expected value of filing suit (EVp ) is positively
related to D. This implies that an increase in D will make it optimal to
file suit in cases in which the plaintiff’s information about the probability
of liability ( and p ) are lower, in which plaintiff’s costs are higher, and
in which defendant’s costs are lower. With the exception of the decrease
in defendant’s costs, all of these selection-induced changes in the composition of cases filed imply that the trial rate will be lower where the stakes
are higher, weakening the direct effect.
The direct effect of plaintiff’s costs (Cp ) on the trial rate is negative,
but there is an offsetting effect through the case selection process. EVp 
is negatively related to Cp . This implies that an increase in Cp will make
it optimal to file suit in cases in which the plaintiff’s information about the
probability of liability ( and p ) is more favorable, in which the stakes
are higher, and in which defendant’s costs are higher. With the exception
of the increase in defendant’s costs, all of these selection-induced changes
in the composition of cases filed imply that the trial rate will be higher
where the plaintiff’s costs of litigation are higher, weakening the direct
effect.
The direct effect of defendant’s costs (Cd ) on the trial rate is negative,
and the effect through the selection process reinforces the direct effect.
EVp  is positively related to Cd . This implies that an increase in Cd will
make it optimal to file suit in cases in which the plaintiff’s information
about the probability of liability ( and p ) is less favorable, in which
the stakes are lower, and in which plaintiff’s costs are higher. All of these
selection-induced changes in the composition of cases filed imply that the
trial rate will be lower where the defendant’s costs of litigation are higher,
reinforcing the direct effect.
The first three columns of Table 1 contain a summary of the predictions
of the model with regard to the relationships between the trial rate and case
characteristics. The predictions are unambiguously negative with regard to
the effects of  and Cd on the trial rate. But there are not clear predictions
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Table 1. Summary of Predictions of Selection Model for Trial Rates and
Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial by Case Characteristic
Trial Rate
Parameter

D
Cp
Cd

Win Rate

Direct

Selection

Overall

Direct

Selection

Overall

0
+
−
−

−
−
+
−

−
?
?
−

+
0
0
0

+
−
+
−

+
−
+
−

with regard to the effects of D and Cp on trial rates, because the direct
and selection effects are offsetting. However, if we assume that the direct
effects dominate, then the trial rate is positively related to D and negatively
related to Cp .

3.3. Implications of the Model for Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial
The model has implications for how plaintiff win rates at trial vary
with the parties’ litigation costs by means of the case selection process.
We represent the probability that the defendant is liable at trial as
 t =  + t 

(21)

where  is the common component of the probability of liability and t is
a random component with zero mean that is uncorrelated with case characteristics or with the plaintiff’s or defendant’s idiosyncratic component
of the probability of liability (p and d ). The observed win rate at trial
is the expectation of t , conditioned on both a case’s being filed and the
case’s being decided at trial. This is
Et  = E + t EVp  > 0 p − d D − Cp + Cd  > 0 (22)
= EEVp  > 0 p − d D − Cp + Cd  > 0

(23)

where the first conditioning event is that the claim is filed as a lawsuit
and the second conditioning event is that the case was decided at trial.
The second equality follows from the fact that t has zero mean and is
uncorrelated with case characteristics so that its conditional expectation
is also zero. The probability of a trial (the second conditioning event)
does not depend directly on the common information on the probability
of liability (). Thus, the effect of selection on case characteristics is
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due to the plaintiff’s decision regarding whether to file a lawsuit. Case
characteristics will affect the plaintiff win rate to the extent that they
affect the distribution of  by means of the selection process.
Higher values of plaintiff’s costs imply that the minimum threshold
value of  at which potential plaintiffs decide to file lawsuits will increase,
ceteris paribus. Thus, plaintiff win rates at trial will be higher where plaintiff’s costs are higher. Higher stakes and higher defendant’s costs imply
the opposite. The minimum threshold value of  at which potential plaintiffs decide to file lawsuits will decrease where the stakes or defendant
costs are higher, ceteris paribus. Thus, plaintiff win rates at trial will be
lower where the stakes or defendant’s costs are higher. These predictions
are summarized in the last three columns of Table 1.
One potential complication is that the expected outcome of the case
(D) may affect the costs of litigation. It may be optimal for the parties to
spend more to pursue or defend high-expected-outcome cases. Thus, there
is a direct effect of the expected outcome on the case selection decision,
and there is an indirect effect through the costs. The indirect effect through
the defendant’s costs works in the same direction as the direct effect of
the stakes. Higher expected outcomes and higher defendant costs yield a
higher EVp , which implies that potential plaintiffs will be more likely
to file suit. But the indirect effect through the plaintiff’s costs works in
the opposite direction. Higher plaintiff’s costs reduce the likelihood that
the potential plaintiff will decide to file a suit. We assume that the direct
effect dominates so that an increase in the expected stakes will never raise
plaintiff’s costs so much that the plaintiff becomes less likely to file suit.
Our analysis has implications for how case outcomes (trial rates and
plaintiff win rates) with the federal government as a party differ from
case outcomes with two private parties. These implications are derived
from institutional and legal differences between cases with the two types
of parties, differences with regard to the probability of liability (), the
stakes of the case (D), and the litigation costs (Cp and Cd ).

4. The Government as Defendant: Tort Claims
Consider a private plaintiff who is deciding whether or not to file suit
in a particular case. This decision will be based on the value of EVp 
as described in equations (1) and (2). The difference between cases in
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which the potential defendant is the government and those in which the
potential defendant is a private party depends on how tort litigation with
the government and private parties differ with regard to litigation costs
(Cd and Cp ) and the components of expected damages ( and D).
With regard to defendants’ costs, it is plausible that the government’s
costs, both quantifiable and the broader, more subjective aspect of costs
already noted, differ from those of private litigants. We suspect that, on
average, the federal government is less fearful of litigation than are private
litigants. Government is, after all, as permanent a secular institution as we
have and has been litigating for hundreds of years. Litigation to enforce
laws and defend against attacks on laws and government policies is part of
its routine. Government is so large relative to most other litigants that it,
more than the average litigant, knows substantial litigation will be a part
of its existence. For private litigants, especially individuals and smaller
companies, litigation is unusual, almost always unwelcome, and stressful.
People are quite averse to litigation (Danzon, 1985; Hensler et al., 1991;
Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 1990). In addition, the
government does not face bet-the-company cases, which might reduce a
private firm’s taste for litigation. And the government, which need not
trade in the private market, may respond to inputs less quantifiable than
profit maximization (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a, p. 750).
It is also plausible, but not certain, that the government’s defense
costs are, on average, lower than those of private defendants in similar
cases. Because of its continuing existence and repeated actions, government repeatedly defends lawsuits and presumably learns from experience,
thereby lowering its relative costs (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a, p. 751).
Some government officials may specialize in litigating a particular class of
disputes (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988a, p. 751). On average, private litigants are less likely to have such specialization. The federal government,
unlike many private defendants, often has lawyers available to defend it in
litigation. It often does not need to retain counsel on an hourly or contingent basis to defend the action. Of course, many private litigants may have
counsel available, but not all will have such access to the extent the government does. We thus believe that the government, on average (though
not in every case), has lower litigation costs than do private defendants.11
11. Although we think traditional costs and less quantifiable cost factors are lower
for the government, that assumption is not necessary to support exploring whether
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Based on our selection model, as summarized in Table 1, this suggests
that the trial rate will be higher and the plaintiff win rate will be higher
in tort cases in which the government is defendant relative to cases with
a private party as defendant.
But the difference in costs is not the only contrast between cases with
a private defendant and cases with the government as defendant. Earlier
we noted differences between the law governing FTCA cases against the
United States and private diversity-based tort actions, differences that can
affect the components of expected damages. We address five differences in
tort litigation: (1) a jurisdictional amount limitation, (2) punitive damages,
(3) the availability of jury trial, (4) the discretionary function exception
under the FTCA, and (5) exhaustion of remedies.
The jurisdictional amount limitation for diversity cases means that
federal courts see a select group of state-law-based personal injury tort
cases. Only those cases with more than $75,000 ($50,000 before 1996
and $10,000 before 1988) in controversy are eligible for federal litigation,
thus limiting federal courts to big diversity cases. One thus expects federal
court diversity cases to differ from the mass of tort cases in the amount at
stake.12 The low-stakes cases are not similarly trimmed in FTCA actions.
Since there is no jurisdictional amount limitation in FTCA cases, a group
of low-stakes cases may be filed against the United States in federal court
that cannot be filed against private parties accused of the same behavior. The inability to recover punitive damages further lowers the stakes in
FTCA cases compared with diversity cases.13

the government as litigant differs from private litigants. Those who believe government
costs to be higher or the same as the costs of private parties would merely predict effects
opposite to those we predict, or predict no effects. Regardless of one’s assumptions
about the government’s attitude towards litigation as compared to that of private parties,
exploring whether government litigation is in fact descriptively different is worthwhile.
12. This turns out to be the case, with federal court diversity tort cases having much
higher mean and median recoveries than tort cases adjudicated in state court, where
there is no minimum-damage threshold. (Eisenberg et al., 1996, p. 439). Tabulation
of amounts awarded to winning plaintiffs in federal court also show somewhat higher
mean and median awards in diversity cases, relative to FTCA cases.
13. Available data suggest, however, that punitive damages are very rarely awarded
in personal injury tort litigation, so the jurisdictional amount limitation is probably the
dominant effect on stakes (Daniels and Martin, 1995; Eisenberg et al., 1997, pp. 633–
37; Moller, 1996; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995, p. 6.).
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It is not clear how the unavailability of jury trials against the United
States affects the composition of cases filed relative to cases brought
against private parties. It may be that the possibility of a jury trial leads
plaintiffs to file cases with low probability of winning () but possibly
high awards (D) in those cases they do win (e.g., Clermont and Eisenberg, 1992, pp. 1140–43; Salop and White, pp. 1018–19). The effect of
this on expected returns (D) is ambiguous.
Nor is it clear how the discretionary function defense available to the
United States under the FTCA will affect the composition of cases. This
defense embodies the principal that “it is not a tort to govern” and thus
gives the government leeway to make the decisions necessary to govern
without being subjected to tort liability when discretionary decisions do
not work out.14 On the one hand, this added defense available to the
government may reduce the probability of a plaintiff win against the government as compared to the probability of a plaintiff win against a private party. On the other hand, since private parties do not face the range
of decisions that governments face, the discretionary function exception
may narrow the differences in the subject matters of private and FTCA
actions.15
Finally, the requirement that plaintiffs in actions against the government exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit serves to narrow
the difference between cases against the government under the FTCA and
diversity cases against private parties. The exhaustion-of-remedies requirement likely increases the costs of plaintiffs in government-defendant cases
compared with the costs of plaintiffs in private-defendant cases.
Overall, our analysis of how the legal differences between suits filed
against the government under the FTCA and diversity cases with private
defendants concludes that cases filed against the government have, on
average, lower defendant costs, lower stakes, and higher plaintiff’s costs.16
14. For example, Bergh v. Washington (p. 812; concurring opinion).
15. The discretionary function exception creates a rather fine line. Compare
Berkovitz v. United States (discretionary function exception did not protect United
States in action based on allegedly wrongful licensing and release of vaccine) with
United States v. Gaubert (discretionary function exception may protect operational- or
management-level decisions by regulatory bodies that became involved in the day-today operation of a savings and loan association).
16. Concern for reputation may differ between government and private defendants,
as might incentives for lawyers. Although our model is not rich enough to examine
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Table 2. Summary of Predictions of Selection Model for Trial Rates and
Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial: Differences between Government and Private
Parties
Type of Case
Personal injury
Job discrimination
Job discrimination

Government Role

Trial Rate

Plaintiff Win Rate

Defendant
Defendant
Plaintiff

Gov > Priv
Gov > Priv
Gov < Priv

Gov > Priv
Gov > Priv
Gov > Priv

Using the selection model summarized in Table 1, we see that the lower
stakes and higher plaintiff’s costs have ambiguous effects on the trial rate,
but the lower defendant costs imply a higher trial rate in cases against
the government. There is no such ambiguity with regard to the plaintiff
win rate at trial. The selection model predicts that the lower stakes, higher
plaintiff’s costs, and lower defendant costs will result in higher plaintiff
win rates at trial when the government is defendant. These predictions are
summarized in the first row of Table 2.

5. The Government in Job Discrimination Cases
5.1. The Government as Defendant
As in tort cases, we assume that the government’s defense costs in job
discrimination cases are, on average, lower than private defendants’ costs.
Donohue and Siegelman (1993, p. 728) observe that “federal officials are
likely to be far less sensitive to the cost of potential Title VII damages
awards than private employers are.” And, as before, we predict higher trial
rates in cases involving the United States as defendant and higher plaintiff
win rates. It is again necessary to account for differences in legal rules
applicable to government and private defendants.
Government and private defendants operate under somewhat different
rules in job discrimination cases, though the differences are not as great
as in tort cases. Perhaps the most important difference is the lack of an
reputation’s role, if reputational factors are more important to the government, the case
selection process should yield a stronger set of plaintiff claims against the government
than against private defendants. Our selection model implies that a stronger set of filed
cases (higher ) implies a lower trial rate and a higher plaintiff win rate at trial.
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alternative statutory remedy against the United States for job discrimination. The alternative remedy against private parties for job discrimination,
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, gave black plaintiffs a chance for compensatory and punitive damages against private defendants.17 Since such
damages are not available against the United States, the stakes (D) are
lower in job discrimination cases with the government as defendant, relative to private-defendant cases.
Our analysis of how the legal differences between job discrimination
suits filed against the government differ from job discrimination suits filed
against private defendants suggests that cases filed against the government have, on average, lower defendant costs and lower stakes. Using
the selection model summarized in Table 1, we see that the lower stakes
have ambiguous effects on the trial rate, but the lower defendant costs
imply a higher trial rate in cases against the government. The model has a
clear prediction with regard to the plaintiff win rate at trial. The selection
model predicts that the lower stakes and lower defendant costs will result
in higher plaintiff win rates at trial when the government is defendant.
These predictions are summarized in the second row of Table 2.

5.2. The Government as Plaintiff
Job discrimination is the only subject matter area for which we have
data, for which both the government and private parties frequently appear
as plaintiffs, and for which the law applicable to the government is substantially similar to the law applicable to private parties.18 But there are
differences.
Job discrimination cases in which the government appears as plaintiff
have gone through an elaborate screening process. The EEOC chooses,
from among the thousands of complaints filed with it, which complaints
to convert to lawsuits brought in its own name. It is not clear to us that
the government as plaintiff has lower mean financial costs than private job
discrimination plaintiffs, but the decision to file suit likely differs between
17. After 1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made such damages available to female
plaintiffs suing private parties. But our results do not materially differ if we limit the
sample to cases filed in 1991 and earlier. See note 3.
18. The other class of cases in which we study the government as defendant, personal injury tort cases, does not contain cases in which the government appears as
plaintiff. The government does not suffer personal injuries in the way that private individuals do and so does not appear as a plaintiff in personal injury tort actions.
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the EEOC and private plaintiffs. Presumably, the EEOC screens cases
carefully and makes litigation choices based on the economic merits of
the case. But the class of individuals who bring job discrimination cases
is dominated by people who have lost their jobs (Donohue and Siegelman,
1991, p. 984). These private plaintiffs in job discrimination cases are, on
average, those job-losers with the lowest costs of litigation, where costs
of litigation are defined broadly to include pecuniary as well as (perhaps
negative) nonpecuniary costs.
On this basis, a crude characterization of the government’s case selection process in job discrimination cases is that the government selects
“high quality” cases, that is, cases with a relatively high probability of
plaintiff victory (high ). In contrast, the selection process of private
plaintiffs in job discrimination cases is more likely to depend on relatively low litigation costs (low Cp ), often nonpecuniary, that come from
the experience of a job loss.19
The selection model, summarized in Table 1, implies that the higher
value of  in discrimination cases brought by the government will result in
a lower trial rate. The higher effective costs to the government as plaintiff
have a negative direct effect on the trial rate, which is offset to some
extent by a positive selection effect. The higher values of  and of Cp both
imply unambiguously higher plaintiff win rates at trial. These predictions
are summarized in the last row of Table 2.

6. The Data
The data used here were gathered by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center.20 When any civil case terminates in federal district court, the court clerk transmits to the Administrative Office a form containing information about the case. The form
includes data regarding the subject matter of the case, removal status,
the amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination, the procedural
progress of the case at termination, the method of disposition, and, when
a judgment has been entered, who prevailed and any amount awarded in
19. In other areas of law plaintiffs in employment cases also fare unusually poorly
(Hillman, 1998, pp. 583, 591–93).
20. For a fuller description of the database, see Clermont and Eisenberg (1992,
pp. 1133–34).
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damages. The form distinguishes among many subject matter categories,
including branches of contract, tort, and other areas of law. The form
distinguishes among several areas of personal injury tort law. It also contains a category labeled “job discrimination” that includes Title VII cases,
section 1981 cases, and cases from other branches of antidiscrimination
employment law.
For present purposes, a key aspect of the data is that it indicates the
jurisdictional basis for each case’s presence in federal court. Four bases
of federal jurisdiction are relevant: (1) the United States is a plaintiff, (2)
the United States is a defendant, (3) the case involves a federal question,
one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (4)
the case arises under state law but involves parties who are citizens of
different states, the so-called diversity jurisdiction.
By using the subject matter of the cases and the basis for jurisdiction,
we can identify personal injury tort cases against the United States, and
personal injury tort cases based on diversity jurisdiction. Further, we can
distinguish job discrimination cases brought by and against the United
States from job discrimination cases brought by and against other parties.21
We create two samples from these data. Our first sample contains all
personal injury cases filed in federal court between July 1, 1979, and
September 30, 2000, based on diversity jurisdiction or with the government as defendant. This sample contains 480,765 cases, comprising
423,600 diversity cases and 57,165 cases with the government as defendant.22 Our second sample contains all job discrimination cases filed in
federal court over the same period. This sample contains 272,156 cases,
21. A portion, presumably small, of the job discrimination cases treated here as
private-defendant cases are in fact filed against state governments, and we have no way
to separate those cases out. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994). The tort cases we consider
do not include actions against states. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits state-lawbased tort actions from being brought against states in federal court. See Welch v. State
Dep’t of Highways and Public Transp. (Jones Act); Florida Dep’t of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc. (admiralty cases).
22. We deleted all personal injury cases filed in two of the 91 federal districts (a
total of 12,381 cases) because there was one year in each district for which an unusually
large number of tort claims were filed in a single month, claims that have not been
resolved despite their being pending for six years in one district and for 13 years in
the other. See our discussion, below, of the analytical difficulties raised by unresolved
cases.
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comprising 243,665 cases involving only private parties, 19,673 cases with
the government as defendant, and 8,818 cases with the federal government
as plaintiff.
Since our data end with the close of the 2000 federal government
fiscal year, we have no data on case progress after September 30, 2000.
Thus, any cases not resolved by that date are censored in the sense that
their outcomes are not observed. Of the 480,765 personal injury cases
filed between July 1979 and September 2000, 457,482 were resolved and
23,283 were not resolved in time for the resolution to be recorded in our
data. Of the 272,156 job discrimination cases filed between July 1979 and
September 2000, 243,866 were resolved and 24,290 were not resolved in
time for the resolution to be recorded in our data. This censoring is an
important statistical problem in the analysis of trial rates and outcomes
because cases that proceed to trial are likely to take substantially longer
to resolve than cases that are dropped or settled without a trial verdict.
Thus, tried cases will be censored disproportionately.
Table 3 shows the number of cases in our sample filed in each calendar
year by category of case.23 Table 3 also shows the fraction of cases pending as of September 30, 2000, by year of filing. Overall, about 5% of the
personal injury cases and 9% of the job discrimination cases in our samples are censored, and it is clear that cases filed more recently are much
more likely to be censored.
That this censoring is an important problem is apparent from the tabulations of the fraction of cases tried by year of filing, as contained in
Table 3. This fraction is computed as the fraction of resolved cases for
which there was a trial verdict. The trial rate computed this way falls dramatically with the year of filing. This does not represent purely a real
decline in trial rates and is in large part an artifact of the decline in time
until the censoring date, with the concomitant lack of time for cases that
will ultimately be tried to reach a trial verdict.
A straightforward approach to the censoring problem is to use
only cases filed long enough before 2000 that the censoring problem
23. The number of cases filed in 1979 is about half of the number in the immediately succeeding years, because we exclude cases filed before July 1, 1979. This
date marks the beginning of the data’s inclusion of the party for whom judgment was
entered. Similarly, the number of cases filed in 2000 is about three-fourths the number
of cases filed in the immediately preceding years, because we have no data on cases
filed after September 30, 2000.
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Table 3. Case Distribution and Resolution by Year of Filing
Personal Injury Cases

Job Discrimination Cases

Year
Filed

Number
of Cases

Fraction
Pending

Fraction
Tried

Number
of Cases

Fraction
Pending

Fraction
Tried

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

7,003
14,197
11,934
12,783
12,317
11,858
17,808
23,948
25,316
28,641
28,717
25,727
23,080
24,864
28,614
27,774
32,148
28,947
29,586
24,875
24,619
16,009
480,765

00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00001
00001
00000
00002
00001
00001
00002
00002
00001
00007
00015
00080
00231
00666
01003
02701
06969
00484

00824
00976
00920
00942
00911
00957
00708
00610
00619
00492
00450
00489
00482
00459
00387
00392
00356
00377
00337
00297
00166
00033
00510

2,432
5,491
7,049
8,324
10,027
8,493
8,660
9,130
8,493
8,674
8,380
8,122
9,115
11,205
13,500
16,524
20,443
22,910
24,172
23,368
22,442
15,202
272,156

00000
00004
00000
00002
00002
00001
00001
00001
00002
00001
00002
00006
00003
00003
00016
00030
00050
00100
00300
00966
03617
08396
00893

01727
01620
01644
01508
01326
01229
01172
01037
00954
00936
00859
00825
00765
00736
00711
00611
00516
00448
00390
00294
00174
00086
00743

Total

Notes: Fraction Pending is computed as the fraction of Number of Cases Filed that are not resolved by
September 30, 2000. Fraction Tried is computed as the fraction of cases resolved by September 30, 2000,
that were tried to a verdict.

is minimal.24 However, the overall trial rate is less than 6% for personal
injury cases and less than 8% for job discrimination cases (though this
is a somewhat downward-biased estimate, given the censoring). Even
a small amount of censoring is likely to seriously affect estimates of
the trial rate. Thus, the fact that 2.3% of personal injury cases filed in
1996 are unresolved makes even this year unsuitable for the analysis of
24. In our earlier work we developed a number of parametric statistical models
that accounted for the censoring (Eisenberg and Farber, 1997, pp. S103–S106). These
models relied on strong parametric assumptions, but we were restricted to using data
on cases filed from 1986–1994 and closed by September 30, 1994. Given the relatively
smaller sample size, dropping cases filed in the latter part of the sample period was
unfeasible. The longer time period used here makes it feasible to drop cases filed in
the later years while preserving adequate sample sizes.
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trial rates. The fraction of personal injury cases that are unresolved (the
censoring rate) falls to 0.15% for cases filed in 1994. Thus, we limit
our analysis of personal injury cases to cases filed 1979–1994 that were
resolved by September 30, 2000, in order to be reasonably sure that censoring is not be a significant problem.25 The censoring rate falls off more
gradually for job discrimination cases. The censoring rate is 1% for job
discrimination cases filed in 1996, 0.5% for cases filed in 1995, and 0.3%
for cases filed in 1994. We also limit our analysis of job discrimination cases to those filed 1979–1994 that were resolved by September 30,
2000.26
Although measuring the trial rate is straightforward, determining or
even defining who wins at trial is not. The data are fairly limited on this
question, and we define a party as winning if a judgment was entered for
that party. The central problem with this measure is that just because a
judgment was entered for a particular party does not mean that the party in
fact “won.” For example, a plaintiff who files suit expecting a substantial
damage award may settle for or receive at trial a very small damage award.
This case would be recorded as a judgment for the plaintiff, and we call
this a plaintiff win. But the plaintiff might perceive this as a loss. It is also
the case that information on the identity of the party for whom judgment
was entered is missing in 10.4% of the cases with trial outcomes.27
The data record the broad legal category of each case. Table 4 lists
these categories and shows (1) the number of cases in each category in
our sample, (2) the rate at which cases in each category are resolved
at trial, and (3) the rate at which cases ending in trial judgments are
won by plaintiffs. The largest categories of personal injury (PI) cases are
“motor vehicle,” “other PI,” “asbestos,” and “PI product liability.” There
25. Of the 324,581 personal injury cases filed between 1979 and 1994, only 88
(0.03%) were censored as of September 30, 2000. As discussed in note 22, we dropped
all cases filed in two districts because of a large number of long-term pending cases.
Of the 6,377 cases filed in these districts between 1979 and 1994, fully 1,690 (26.5%)
were pending as of September 30, 2000.
26. Of the 143,619 job discrimination cases filed between 1979 and 1994, only 95
(0.07%) were censored as of September 30, 2000.
27. A portion (19.8%) of the cases we code as missing had a judgment entered for
both parties. The missing data problem is much more severe in cases resolved without
a trial verdict, where 86.2% are missing information on the identity of the party for
whom a judgment was entered. Presumably, these are largely cases that are dropped or
settled without having a formal judgment entered in court.
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Table 4. Case Distribution and Outcomes by Case Category
Case Category
Personal injury
Airplane
Assault, libel, slander
Marine
Motor vehicle
Other PI
Medical PI
Asbestos
PI product liability
Total
Job discrimination

Cases
Count

Gov Def
Fraction

Gov Pltf
Fraction

Trial
Rate

Pltf Win
Rate

5,926
7,453
6,309
79,195
81,503
18,904
52,375
72,916
324,581
143,619

0278
0136
0311
0129
0198
0403
0003
0045
0130
0085

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.044

0081
0060
0076
0066
0079
0112
0010
0049
0059
0101

0456
0501
0545
0631
0449
0367
0683
0286
0468
0267

Notes: The number of cases consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in federal courts
between July 1979 and December 1994 and resolved (dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September
30, 2000. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. The
Plaintiff win rate is computed as the ratio of the number of cases in which a judgment was entered for the
plaintiff after a trial verdict, divided by the number of cases in which a judgment was entered for one party
or the other after a trial verdict.

is significant variation in the level of government involvement across legal
categories, ranging from a low of 0.3% of asbestos cases having the federal government as defendant to a high of 40.3% of medical PI cases
having the federal government as defendant. There is also a substantial
difference in trial rates across categories, with the highest trial rates in
“medical PI” and the lowest trial rates in “asbestos.” Plaintiff win rates at
trial vary substantially across personal injury case categories, from a low
of 28.6% in “PI product liability” to a high of 68% in “asbestos” cases.
Plaintiff win rates in job discrimination cases are quite low at 26.7%.

7. Empirical Results
7.1. Trial Rates—Government as Defendant
Table 5 contains tabulations of trial rates by party identity and case category. As a benchmark, the first column of the table contains the trial rate
for each case category for cases with private defendants. The second column contains the trial rates by case category for cases with the government
as defendant. The prediction of the case selection model, summarized in
Tables 1 and 2, for both personal injury and job discrimination cases is
that trial rates will be higher in cases with the government as defendant,
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Table 5. Trial Rates by Party Identity and Case Category
Case Category
Personal Injury
Airplane
Assault, libel, slander
Marine
Motor vehicle
Other PI
Medical PI
Asbestos
PI product liability
All PI
Job discrimination

Private

Gov Def

0068
0003
0062
0003
0065
0003
0063
0001
0074
0001
0110
0002
0010
0001
0047
0001
0054
0000
0101
0001

0114
0007
0046
0009
0101
0007
0082
0003
0097
0002
0116
0003
0020
0024
0075
0005
0094
0001
0120
0003

Gov
0046
0007
−0016
0008
0036
0006
0018
0002
0023
0002
0005
0003
0010
0019
0027
0004
0040
0001
0019
0003

Gov Pltf

Gov

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.067
(0.004)

−0.034
(0.004)

Notes: The sample consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in federal courts between July
1979 and December 1994 and resolved (dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September 30, 2000. The
trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. The Gov column
reports the differences in trial rates between cases with the indicated government parties and the trial rate in
cases with private parties. There are no personal injury cases with government as plaintiff. Sample sizes are
contained in Table 4. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

and the tabulations are consistent with this prediction. The third column
of the table contains the difference in trial rates between cases with the
government as defendant and cases with private defendants. Overall, trial
rates are 4.0 percentage points higher in personal injury cases with the
government as defendant (p < 0005). Substantively, the 4.0-point difference is substantial, implying that trial rates in personal injury cases
with the government as defendant are fully 74% higher than trial rates
in those with private defendants. The difference in trial rates is somewhat
smaller, though still significant, at 1.9 percentage points in job discrimination cases (p < 0005). This implies that trial rates are 19% higher in job
discrimination cases with government defendants than in those with private defendants. Within the personal injury cases the trial rates are higher
in cases with the government as defendant in all case categories save one
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(“assault, libel, slander”), and the differences are statistically significant
at conventional levels in all but “asbestos” and “medical PI” cases.28
It is possible that the mix of personal injury cases differs for private and
government defendants. Trial rates are known to differ across categories
of personal injury tort cases. For example, medical malpractice cases have
high trial rates, compared to all other classes of personal injury tort cases
(Eisenberg et al., 1996). This is true for both state and federal court cases.
However, it is unlikely that the difference in trial rates for the aggregated
personal injury category is the result of a different mix of personal injury
cases’ being filed against government and private defendants, because the
trial rates in virtually every category are higher for cases with the government as defendant.
Potentially more important is the possibility that the mix of cases
and outcomes has varied over time or varies systematically across district courts in ways that make it appear the trial rate is higher in cases
with the government as defendant. In order to investigate these possibilities, we estimated probit models of the probability of a trial that include
fixed effects for case category (eight categories for personal injury and
one category for job discrimination), year of filing (16 years), and federal court district (89 districts).29 These results are contained in Tables 6
and 7.
Based on the estimates in Table 6, the probit estimate of the raw 3.4
percentage point difference in trial rates in personal injury cases is reduced
by over half (to 1.4 percentage points), controlling for case category.30
Controlling for year of filing alone reduces the difference from 3.4 points
28. The “assault, libel, slander” category is conceptually awkward because it lumps
together quite different torts. Furthermore, assault cases may well be qualitatively different as between government and private defendants. Assaults involving government
defendants have civil rights overtones that are lacking in assault cases involving private
defendants. However, we expect that most assault cases involving government officials
would appear in the Administrative Office Data’s civil rights categories, not its tort
categories.
29. The analysis of personal injury cases uses data from 89 of the 91 federal districts
because of the large number of pending cases in two districts. See notes 22 and 25 and
the related discussion.
30. The fact that the normalized probit estimate in column 1 of Table 6 shows a 3.4
percentage point raw difference while column 3 of Table 5 shows a 4.0 percentage point
difference is due to the nonlinear nature of the probit model. We have reestimated all of
the probit models presented in Tables 6–8 and 10–12, using linear probability models
(guaranteed to go through the mean), and the results are substantively unchanged.
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Table 6. Effect of Defendant Identity on Trial Rates, Normalized Probit
Estimates: Personal Injury Cases

Gov
Case category
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0034
0001
No
No
No

0014
0001
Yes
No
No

0026
0001
No
Yes
No

0035
0001
No
No
Yes

0016
0001
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a probit model
of the probability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the adjusted
difference in trial rates between cases with the government as defendant and the trial rate in cases with
private defendants. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative of the probability of the
 ˆ , where ˆ is the
outcome with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as ˆ X
 is the vector of means of the explanatory variables,
vector of estimated parameters of the probit model, X
and is the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of 300,124 personal injury
lawsuits filed in federal courts between July 1979 and December 1994 and resolved (dropped, settled, or
tried to a verdict) by September 30, 2000. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that were tried to a verdict
by September 30, 2000. There are eight case categories, 16 filing years, and 89 district courts. The numbers
in parentheses are standard errors.

to 2.6 points. Controlling for the district court does not affect the difference. Overall, controlling for case category, filing year, and district court
reduces the raw difference from 3.4 points to 1.6 points. This difference
remains strongly statistically significant and is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Table 7. Effect of Defendant Identity on Trial Rates, Normalized Probit
Estimates: Job Discrimination Cases

Gov
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0018
0003
No
No

0017
0003
Yes
No

0020
0003
No
Yes

0019
0003
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a probit model
of the probability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the adjusted
difference in trial rates between cases with the government as defendant and the trial rate in cases with
private defendants. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative of the probability of the
 ˆ , where ˆ is the
outcome with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as ˆ X
 is the vector of means of the explanatory variables,
vector of estimated parameters of the probit model, X
and is the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of 137,192 job
discrimination lawsuits filed in federal courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and December 1994
and resolved (dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September 30, 2000. The trial rate is the fraction of
cases that were tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. There are 16 filing years and 91 district courts.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Similar estimates for job discrimination cases are contained in Table 7.
The raw difference of 1.8 percentage points is not affected significantly
by the inclusion of the control variables. Controlling for filing year and
district court leaves the point estimate of the raw difference unchanged.
Once again, this difference remains strongly statistically significant and is
consistent with the prediction of our model.

7.2. Trial Rates—Government as Plaintiff
Our analysis of the government as plaintiff focuses only on job discrimination cases. The entry in the fourth column of Table 5 contains the
trial rate for job discrimination cases with the government as plaintiff.
The prediction of the case selection model for job discrimination cases
is that trial rates will be lower in cases with the government as plaintiff,
and the tabulations are consistent with this prediction. The fifth column of
the table contains the difference in trial rates between cases with the government as plaintiff and cases with private plaintiffs. Trial rates are 3.4
percentage points lower in job discrimination cases with the government
as plaintiff (p < 0005).
Once again, in order to consider the role of filing year and federal court
district, we estimated probit models of the probability of a trial verdict
that include fixed effects in these dimensions. These estimates are contained in Table 8. The normalized probit estimate of the raw difference is
Table 8. Effect of Plaintiff Identity on Trial Rates, Normalized Probit
Estimates: Job Discrimination Cases

Gov
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0039
0004
No
No

−0037
0004
Yes
No

−0035
0004
No
Yes

−0032
0004
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government plaintiff in a probit model
of the probability of a trial verdict on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the adjusted
difference in trial rates between cases with the government as plaintiff and the trial rate in cases with private
plaintiffs. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative of the probability of the outcome with
 ˆ , where ˆ is the vector of
respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as ˆ X
 is the vector of means of the explanatory variables, and is
estimated parameters of the probit model, X
the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of 131,297 job discrimination lawsuits
filed in federal courts against private defendants between July 1979 and December 1994 and resolved
(dropped, settled, or tried to a verdict) by September 30, 2000. The trial rate is the fraction of cases that
were tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. There are 16 filing years and 91 district courts. The numbers
in parentheses are standard errors.
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−39 points, and controlling for filing year alone and district court alone
have only a very small effect on the estimated difference. The raw difference is reduced to −32 percentage points by the inclusion of both sets of
control variables. This difference remains strongly statistically significant
and is consistent with the prediction of our model.

7.3. Plaintiff Win Rates—Government as Defendant
Table 9 contains tabulations of plaintiff win rates at trial by party identity and case category. As a benchmark, the first column of the table contains the plaintiff win rate for each case category for cases with private
defendants. The second column contains the win rate by case category
for cases with the government as defendant. The prediction of the case
Table 9. Plaintiff Win Rates at Trial by Party Identity and Case Category
Case Category
Personal Injury
Airplane
Assault, libel, and slander
Marine
Motor vehicle
Other PI
Medical PI
Asbestos
PI product liability
All PI
Job discrimination

Private

Gov Def

0464
0030
0525
0025
0528
0031
0624
0008
0460
0007
0279
0014
0684
0025
0282
0009
0462
0004
0273
0004

0442
0038
0311
0073
0568
0037
0666
0018
0418
0013
0490
0017
0000
0490
0346
0032
0489
0008
0163
0012

Gov
−0022
0048
−0214
0076
0041
0048
0042
0019
−0042
0015
0211
0022
−0684
0482
0065
0033
0027
0009
−0110
0013

Gov Plntf

Gov

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.447
(0.023)

0.174
(0.023)

Notes: The sample consists of all lawsuits in the indicated categories filed in federal courts between July
1979 and December 1994 and resolved by a trial verdict by September 30, 2000. The Plaintiff win rate is
computed as the ratio of the number of cases in which a judgment was entered for the plaintiff after a trial
verdict, divided by the number of cases in which a judgment was entered for one party or the other after a
trial verdict. The Gov column reports the differences in plaintiff win rates between cases with the
indicated government parties and the plaintiff win rate in cases with private parties. There are no personal
injury cases with government as plaintiff. Summary statistics are contained in Table 4. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 10. Effect of Defendant Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates, Normalized
Probit Estimates: Personal Injury Cases

Gov
Case category
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0027
0009
No
No
No

0035
0010
Yes
No
No

0027
0009
No
Yes
No

0014
0010
No
No
Yes

0020
0011
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a probit model
of the probability of a plaintiff win at trial on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the
adjusted difference in plaintiff win rates between cases with the government as defendant and the trial rate
in cases with private defendants. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative of the probability
 ˆ , where ˆ
of the outcome with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as ˆ X
 is the vector of means of the explanatory
is the vector of estimated parameters of the probit model, X
variables, and is the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of 19,216 personal
injury lawsuits filed in federal courts between July 1979 and December 1994 and tried to a verdict by
September 30, 2000. There are eight case categories, 16 filing years, and 89 district courts. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.

selection model, summarized in Tables 1 and 2, for both personal injury
and job discrimination cases is that plaintiff win rates will be higher in
cases with the government as defendant. The third column of the table
contains the difference in plaintiff win rates between cases with the government as defendant and cases with private defendants. The tabulations
provide mixed evidence on this prediction. Overall, plaintiff win rates are
2.7 percentage points higher in personal injury cases with the government
as defendant (p < 0005) but 11.0 percentage points lower in job discrimination cases with the government as defendant (p < 0005). Within the
personal injury cases, the evidence is also mixed. Of the eight case categories, the point estimate of the difference is positive, as expected, in four
and negative in four. Three of the four positive estimates are significantly
positive at conventional levels and two of the four negative estimates are
significantly different from zero at conventional levels.31
Estimates of probit models of plaintiff win rates at trial that control
for case category, filing year, and federal court district are contained in
Tables 10 and 11 for personal injury and job discrimination cases, respectively. Based on the estimates in Table 10, the raw 2.7 percentage point
31. One of the three contrary results is “assault, libel, slander,” which, as we noted
earlier, is a conceptually awkward category. See note 28.
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Table 11. Effect of Defendant Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates, Normalized
Probit Estimates: Job Discrimination Cases

Gov
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0123
0014
No
No

−0124
0014
Yes
No

−0129
0015
No
Yes

−0131
0015
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government defendant in a probit model
of the probability of a plaintiff win at trial on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the
adjusted difference in the plaintiff win rate between cases with the government as defendant and the
plaintiff win rate in cases with private defendants. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative
of the probability of the outcome with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as
ˆ X
 ˆ , where ˆ is the vector of estimated parameters of the probit model, X
 is the vector of means of the
explanatory variables, and is the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of
14,129 job discrimination lawsuits filed in federal courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and
December 1994 and tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. There are 16 filing years and 91 district
courts. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

difference in win rates in personal injury cases increases to 3.5 percentage
points, controlling for case category. Controlling for year of filing alone
does not change the raw difference substantially, but controlling for the
district court moves the point estimate of the difference to near zero and
insignificance. Overall, controlling for case category, filing year, and district court reduces the raw difference from 2.7 points to 2.0 points. This
difference is marginally statistically significantly positive (p = 056) and
is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Similar estimates for job discrimination cases, where the probit estimate of the raw difference of −123 percentage points is not consistent
with the predictions of the model, are contained in Table 11. The raw
difference is not affected significantly by the inclusion of the control variables. Controlling for filing year and district court increases the point
estimate of the raw difference from −123 points to −131 points, and the
plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases remains inconsistent with the
selection model.

7.4. Plaintiff Win Rates—Government as Plaintiff
As before, our analysis of the government as plaintiff focuses only on
job discrimination cases. The entry in the fourth column and last row of
Table 9 contains the plaintiff win rate for job discrimination cases with
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Table 12. Effect of Plaintiff Identity on Plaintiff Win Rates, Normalized
Probit Estimates: Job Discrimination Cases

Gov
Year of filing
District court

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0158
0022
No
No

0156
0022
Yes
No

0156
0022
No
Yes

0154
0022
Yes
Yes

Notes: Gov is the normalized coefficient on a dummy variable for government plaintiff in a probit model
of the probability of a plaintiff win at trial on the indicated control variables. As such, it represents the
adjusted difference in the plaintiff win rate between cases with the government as plaintiff and the plaintiff
win rate in cases with private plaintiffs. The coefficient is normalized to represent the derivative of the
probability of the outcome with respect to a change in the explanatory variable. This is computed as
ˆ X
 ˆ , where ˆ is the vector of estimated parameters of the probit model, X
 is the vector of means of the
explanatory variables, and is the standard normal probability density function. The sample consists of
13,090 job discrimination lawsuits filed in federal courts by private plaintiffs between July 1979 and
December 1994 and tried to a verdict by September 30, 2000. There are 16 filing years and 91 district
courts. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

the government as plaintiff. The prediction of the case selection model for
job discrimination cases is that plaintiff win rates will be higher in cases
with the government as plaintiff, and the tabulations are consistent with
this prediction. The fifth column of the table contains the difference in
win rates between cases with the government as plaintiff and cases with
private plaintiffs. Plaintiff win rates are 17.4 percentage points higher in
job discrimination cases with the government as plaintiff (p < 0005).
Once again, in order to consider the role of filing year and federal court
district, we estimated probit models of the probability of a plaintiff win at
trial. These estimates are contained in Table 12. The probit estimate of the
raw difference in the plaintiff win rate of 17.4 percentage points is roughly
unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables. Controlling for both
filing year and court district reduces the point estimate of the difference
in plaintiff win rates from 15.8 to 15.4 points. This difference remains
strongly statistically significant and is consistent with the prediction of
our model.

7.5. Further Discussion of Results
Our model’s predictions about trial rates are strongly confirmed, but
the model’s ability to account for trial win rates is more limited. Why
might this be?
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One potential answer is that there are omitted factors affecting the
decision to file claims against the government. Specifically, plaintiffs may
overestimate their chances of success against the government as compared
to their estimates of the chances of success against private parties. Judges
and juries may be more protective of the government than plaintiffs believe
they will be (Eisenberg, 1989, pp. 1599–1600).
The model is especially vulnerable in its prediction that government
defendants are more likely to lose job discrimination trials than are private defendants. In this area, it may be that plaintiffs’ perceptions about
levels of government discrimination are out of line with reality. If plaintiffs’ perceptions about government discriminatory behavior are skewed,
we should observe higher rates of job discrimination lawsuits against the
United States per worker than we observe against private employers. This
is in fact the case.
For example, in 1990 the federal government employed 3.26 million
non–farm workers (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998, Table A-51). The
civilian labor force in that year consisted of approximately 115.5 million non–U.S. government workers (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998, Table A19). About 15% of workers are not covered by Title VII because of its
limitation to large employers (Eisenberg and Schwab, 1988b, p. 602).32
This leaves about 98 million non–U.S. government workers covered by
Title VII, roughly 30 times the number of U.S. government workers. Yet
federal job discrimination lawsuits against non–U.S. government defendants run only roughly eight to nine times the number of job discrimination lawsuits against the United States. Job discrimination lawsuits are
thus filed at a much higher rate against the United States than against private parties, as Donohue and Siegelman found (1993, p. 731).33 Unless
the United States is massively more discriminatory than private parties,
32. Some of these workers could bring an action under § 1981.
33. Sources of increased filings against the government include the existence of
Civil Service protections and the fact that adverse employment decisions by the government can lead to due process complaints (Donohue and Siegelman, 1993, p. 731).
Donohue and Siegelman identify other differences between government employees and
private employees. These include a higher percentage of suits against the government
involving workers who are working for their employer at the time of the suit, the
absence of back-pay awards in such actions, the likely higher damages awards available because of relatively high wages in the federal sector, and the federal government’s
relatively high proportion of minority and female workers.
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this high claiming rate could be the source of the unexpectedly low trial
win rate against the United States.34 A relatively weak class of cases may
be being filed against the United States.
In comparison, the rate of personal injury tort claiming against the
United States is much lower. In federal court alone, diversity actions filed
against private parties are about nine to ten times the number of FTCA
actions against the United States. And the diversity actions comprise a
relatively small fraction of personal injury tort action. Most of it occurs
in state court (Eisenberg et al., 1996). Thus, claiming rates against the
United States in the personal injury tort area probably more accurately
reflect the level of U.S. government misbehavior than do claiming rates
against the United States in the job discrimination area. The United States
appears to act as a magnet for job discrimination plaintiffs in a way that
it does not for tort victims, and this may account for the difference in our
findings regarding plaintiff win rates between the two areas.35

8. Summary and Conclusion
Overall, we found substantial support for the predictions of the case
selection model, summarized in Table 2, for differences in case outcomes
between the government and private litigants. The model generates six
predictions for trial rates and plaintiff win rates for the categories of cases
and roles for the government we study. Five of the six predictions are
34. In fact, the federal government appears to be less discriminatory in employment
on the basis of race and sex. For example, we find, using the February 1995 and
February 1997 Current Population Surveys (CPSs), that, after controlling for education
and age, the gap in wages between men and women and between whites and nonwhites
is significantly smaller in the federal government than in the private sector. We find
additionally that the fraction of nonwhites employed by the federal government is
twice as high as the fraction of whites employed by the federal government, while
there is no difference for females. These differences are probably due, at least in part,
to the existence of the Civil Service System, which attempts to administer employment
decisions in the federal government on race-neutral and sex-neutral grounds. For an
early analysis with similar findings, see Smith (1977).
35. In the context of our model, the higher claiming rate against the government
in job discrimination cases could be due either to lower plaintiff costs (pecuniary or
nonpecuniary) or to relative optimism on the part of plaintiffs against the government
regarding the likelihood of a trial victory (high p ). In either case, our selection model
predicts not only lower plaintiff win rates against the government but also the higher
trial rates we predict and find for job discrimination cases with government defendants.
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supported by the data. The only deviation is that the plaintiff win rate in
job discrimination cases with the government as defendant is lower than
the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with private defendants,
whereas the model predicts the opposite relationship. This anomaly may
be attributable to extraordinarily high job discrimination claiming rates
against the United States.
This study’s results are important in showing the power of modeling
the case selection process carefully when evaluating case outcomes. The
government goes to trial at a higher rate than private parties when it is
defendant and at a lower rate than private parties when it is plaintiff.
The government as defendant appears to lose more often than private
defendants and the government as plaintiff appears to win more often than
private plaintiffs. These findings are easily understood in the context of
the case selection model, and they cannot be easily explained by theories
that rely on such factors as differential quality of counsel.36
Other factors we do not consider here undoubtedly also influence trial
rates and trial win rates.37 We do not deny that alternative explanations
may exist for the patterns we predict and observe. However, our model’s
predictions about both trial rates and success rates in litigation as they
relate to the identity of both plaintiffs and defendants helps to separate its
implications from factors emphasized in other models, which often have
implications for only a single outcome.38
A final point is that testing the case selection model is hampered by the
likelihood that only a tiny fraction of potential claims are filed as lawsuits.
Essentially, we are looking for the effects of the case selection model when
only the “successes” are observed. That the model does as well as it does
with such “partial observability” is encouraging in our view, but more
direct evidence could come from settings where both cases selected and
those not selected can be observed.

36. The results are also consistent in their support for the case selection model with
the results of our earlier work, where we used the distinction between corporations and
individuals as parties in diversity cases (Eisenberg and Farber, 1997).
37. For a survey and synthesis, see Kessler et al. (1996).
38. See Eisenberg and Farber (1997) for mention of alternative explanations.
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